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Posted by : Mahadi Mahbol Ahad, Januari 23, 2011

Agak tersentuh juga rasa apabila membaca Artikel Papa Gomo.

http://www.papagomo.com/2011/01/live-prk-tenang-dulu-tentang-komunis.html


LIVE PRK TENANG - Dulu Tentang Komunis Kini JILAT Komunis





Waktu ini cuaca di Tenang panas terik dan memang sesuai sekali bagi kita yang sedang bertugas pada kempen Pilihanraya Kecil N5 Dun Tenang!
Lihatlah Gambar di atas yang mana seorang Tua yang membangga banggakan dengan bendera DAP! Emmm memang Hampeh si Tua Kutuk ni! 
Gomo menegur dan bertanyakan soalan kepada Pakcik Tua ini kenapa tak bawa Bendera PAS dan Pakcik Tua tu menjawap: 
" Bawak Bendera Rocket Boleh Naik Bulan" 
Hahaha.... Gomo dah ketawa masa Pakcik Tua ni jawap macam tu tapi Gomo tanya lagi soalan cepu Emas: 
" Bila pulak Rocket Nak Bawa Pakcik naik ke Bulan? " 
Pakcik Tua terkial kial lepas tu senyum dah jalan tampa menjawap apa yang Gomo tanyakan! Hahaha 

Mungkin pakcik ini telah hidup pada zaman Perang dingin yang mana kebanyakan maklumat megenai komunis China tidak terkeluar dan tidak disebarkan disebalik negara negara bekas jajahan tirai besi yang mungkin tidak tersebar dengan meluas seperti hari Ini. 



Jom kita baca petikan dari wikipedia mengenai perkara ini.
Amplify’d from en.wikipedia.org
The Great Leap Forward (simplified Chinese: 大跃进; traditional Chinese: 大躍進; pinyin: Dà yuè jìn) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was an economic and social campaign of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reflected in planning decisions from 1958 to 1961, which aimed to use China's vast population to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into a modern communist society through the process of agriculturalization, industrialization, and collectivization. Mao Zedong led the campaign based on the Theory of Productive Forces, and intensified it after being informed of the impending disaster from grain shortages.
Chief changes in the lives of rural Chinese included the introduction of a mandatory process of agricultural collectivization, which was introduced incrementally. Private farming was prohibited, and those engaged in it were labeled as counter revolutionaries and persecuted. Restrictions on rural people were enforced through public struggle sessions, and social pressure. Rural industrialization, officially a priority of the campaign, saw "its development … aborted by the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward."[1] The Great Leap ended in catastrophe, resulting in tens of millions of excess deaths.[2] Recent research puts the death toll somewhere between 36 and 45 million.[3][4] Historian Frank Dikötter asserts that "coercion, terror, and systematic violence were the very foundation of the Great Leap Forward" and it "motivated one of the most deadly mass killings of human history."[5]
The Cambridge History of China presents data on economic growth rates in China from 1953 through 1985, calculated by Harvard professor of political economy Dwight H. Perkins. Of all the periods spanning this time frame, only the 1958-1962 period, the period during which the Great Leap Forward campaign was carried out, was a period of economic regress as defined by the growth rate. "As these figures indicate, enormous amounts of investment produced only modest increases in production or none at all," argued Perkins. "The growth of national income for the entire 1958-65 period was less than half of the 1966-78 period, and it took almost twice the level of investment to produce a given increase in output in the former period as in the latter. In short, the Great Leap was a very expensive disaster."[6]
In subsequent conferences in 1960 and 1962, the negative effects of the Great Leap Forward were studied by the CPC, and Mao was criticized in the party conferences. Party members less economically left-wing like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping rose to power, and Mao was marginalized within the party, leading him to initiate the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

[edit] Background

In October 1949 after the defeat of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Immediately, landlords and wealthier peasants had their land holdings forcibly redistributed to poorer peasants. In the agricultural sectors, crops deemed by the Party to be "full of evil" such as the opium crop, were destroyed and replaced with crops such as rice. Within the Party, there was major debate about redistribution. A moderate faction within the party and Politburo member Liu Shaoqi argued that change should be gradual and any collectivization of the peasantry should wait until industrialization, which could provide the agricultural machinery for mechanized farming. A more radical faction led by Mao Zedong agreed that the best way to finance industrialization was for the government to take control of agriculture, thereby establishing a monopoly over grain distribution and supply. This would allow the state to buy at a low price and sell much higher, thus raising the capital necessary for the industrialization of the country.
It was realized that this policy would be unpopular with the peasants and therefore it was proposed that the peasants should be brought under Party control by the establishment of agricultural collectives which would also facilitate the sharing of tools and draft animals. This policy was gradually pushed through between 1949 and 1958, first by establishing "mutual aid teams" of 5-15 households, then in 1953 "elementary agricultural cooperatives" of 20-40 households, then from 1956 in "higher co-operatives" of 100-300 families. These reforms (sometimes now referred to as The Great Leap Forward) were generally unpopular with the peasants and usually implemented by summoning them to meetings and making them stay there for days and sometimes weeks until they "voluntarily" agreed to join the collective.[citation needed]
Besides these economic changes, the Party implemented major social changes in the countryside including the banishing of all religious and mystic institutions and ceremonies and replacing them with political meetings and propaganda sessions. Attempts were made to enhance rural education and the status of women (allowing females to initiate divorce if they desired) and ending foot-binding, child marriage and opium addiction. Internal passports (called the hukou system) were introduced in 1956, forbidding travel without appropriate authorization. Highest priority was given to the urban proletariat for whom a welfare state was created.
The first phase of collectivization was not a great success and there was widespread famine in 1956, though the Party's propaganda machine announced progressively higher harvests. Moderates within the Party, including Zhou Enlai, argued for a reversal of collectivization. The position of the moderates was strengthened by Khrushchev's 1956 Secret speech at the 20th Congress which uncovered Stalin's crimes and highlighted the failure of his agricultural policies including collectivization in the USSR.
In 1957 Mao responded to the tensions in the Party by promoting free speech and criticism under the 100 Flowers Campaign. In retrospect, some have come to argue that this was a ploy to allow critics of the regime, primarily intellectuals but also low ranking members of the party critical of the agricultural policies, to identify themselves.[7] Some claim that Mao simply swung to the side of the hard-liners once his policies gained strong opposition. Once he had done so, at least half a million were purged under the Anti-Rightist campaign, which effectively silenced any opposition from within the Party or from agricultural experts to the changes which would be implemented under the Great Leap Forward.
By the completion of the first 5 Year Economic Plan in 1957, Mao had come to doubt that the path to socialism that had been taken by the Soviet Union was appropriate for China. He was critical of Khrushchev's reversal of Stalinist policies and alarmed by the uprisings that had taken place in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, and the perception that the USSR was seeking "Peaceful coexistence" with the Western powers. Mao had become convinced that China should follow its own path to Communism.
According to Jonathan Mirsky, a historian and journalist specializing in Chinese affairs, China's isolation from most of the rest of the world, along with the Korean War, had accelerated Mao's attacks on his perceived domestic enemies. It led him to accelerate his designs to develop an economy where the regime would get maximum benefit from rural taxation.[8]
Before the Great Leap, peasants farmed their own small pockets of land, and observed traditional practices connected to markets—festivals, banquets, and paying homage to ancestors.[8] Starting in 1954, peasants were encouraged to form and join collectives, which would putatively increase their efficiency without robbing them of their own land or restricting their livelihoods.[8] By 1958, however, private ownership was entirely abolished and households all over China were forced into state-operated communes. Mao insisted that the communes must produce more grain for the cities and earn foreign exchange from exports.[8]




Propaganda poster of the steel production objective. The text reads: "Take steel as the key link, leap forward in all fields", the text below is pinyin.


The Great Leap Forward campaign began during the period of the Second Five Year Plan which was scheduled to run from 1958–1963, though the campaign itself was discontinued by 1961.[9][10] Mao unveiled the Great Leap Forward at a meeting in January 1958 in Nanjing. The central idea behind the Great Leap was that rapid development of China's agricultural and industrial sectors should take place in parallel. The hope was to industrialize by making use of the massive supply of cheap labour and avoid having to import heavy machinery. To achieve this, Mao advocated that a further round of collectivization modeled on the USSR's "Third Period" was necessary in the Chinese countryside where the existing collectives would be merged into huge People's Communes.




Chinese propaganda poster showing larger-than-human melon


Despite the harmful agricultural innovations, the weather in 1958 was very favorable and the harvest promised to be good. Unfortunately, the amount of labour diverted to steel production and construction projects meant that much of the harvest was left to rot uncollected in some areas. This problem was exacerbated by a devastating locust swarm, which was caused when their natural predators were killed as part of the Great Sparrow Campaign. Although actual harvests were reduced, local officials, under tremendous pressure from central authorities to report record harvests in response to the new innovations, competed with each other to announce increasingly exaggerated results. These were used as a basis for determining the amount of grain to be taken by the State to supply the towns and cities, and to export. This left barely enough for the peasants, and in some areas, starvation set in. During 1958–1960 China continued to be a substantial net exporter of grain, despite the widespread famine experienced in the countryside, as Mao sought to maintain face and convince the outside world of the success of his plans. Foreign aid was refused. When the Japanese foreign minister told his Chinese counterpart Chen Yi of an offer of 100,000 tonnes of wheat to be shipped out of public view, he was rebuffed. John F Kennedy was also aware that the Chinese were exporting food to Africa and Cuba during the famine and said "we've had no indication from the Chinese Communists that they would welcome any offer of food."[24]
In 1959 and 1960 the weather was less favorable, and the situation got considerably worse, with many of China's provinces experiencing severe famine. Droughts, floods, and general bad weather caught China completely by surprise. In July 1959, the Yellow River flooded in East China. According to the Disaster Center,[25] it directly killed, either through starvation from crop failure or drowning, an estimated 2 million people.
In 1960, at least some degree of drought and other bad weather affected 55 percent of cultivated land, while an estimated 60 percent of northern agricultural land received no rain at all.[26]




Propaganda poster displaying the production of grains as if it were rockets shooting into the sky


With dramatically reduced yields, even urban areas suffered much reduced rations; however, mass starvation was largely confined to the countryside, where, as a result of drastically inflated production statistics, very little grain was left for the peasants to eat. Food shortages were bad throughout the country; however, the provinces which had adopted Mao's reforms with the most vigor, such as Anhui, Gansu and Henan, tended to suffer disproportionately. Sichuan, one of China's most populous provinces, known in China as "Heaven's Granary" because of its fertility, is thought to have suffered the greatest absolute numbers of deaths from starvation due to the vigor with which provincial leader Li Jinquan undertook Mao's reforms. During the Great Leap Forward, cases of cannibalism also occurred in the parts of China that were severely affected by drought and famine.[27]
The agricultural policies of the Great Leap Forward and the associated famine would then continue until January 1961, where, at the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, the restoration of agricultural production through a reversal of the Great Leap policies was started. Grain exports were stopped, and imports from Canada and Australia helped to reduce the impact of the food shortages, at least in the coastal cities.

[edit] Deaths by starvation

Starting in the early 1980s, critics of the Great Leap added quantitative muscle to their arsenal. U.S. government employee Judith Banister published what became an influential article in the China Quarterly, and since then estimates as high as 30 million deaths in the Great Leap became common in the U.S. press. Wim F Wertheim, emeritus professor from the University of Amsterdam, disagrees with the numbers presented on the basis that they lack scientific support.[30] Critics of this position point to the numerous studies by individuals such as Aird in 1982, Ashton et al. in 1984, and Peng in 1987 that specifically sought to quantify the Great Leap's demographic impact. A lingering problem that all scholars point to is the assumptions regarding birth rate used in the most widely cited projections of famine deaths. These assumptions make it difficult to gauge the death toll with a high degree of accuracy.
Dr Ping-ti Ho, professor of history at the University of Chicago and an expert in Chinese Demography, in a book titled Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953 (Harvard East Asian Studies No 4, 1959), also mentioned numerous flaws in the 1953 census on which famine death projections are made, though acknowledging the lack of more accurate sources.
Critics of Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's book Mao: The Unknown Story often cite these studies as evidence that their body count (38 million) may be exaggerated. However, sinologist Stuart Schram believes their estimate "may well be the most accurate."[31] Jung Chang argues that "Mao had actually allowed for many more deaths. Although slaughter was not his purpose with the Leap, he was more than ready for myriad deaths to result, and had hinted to his top echelon that they should not be too shocked if they happened."[32] In light of evidence provided in their book, R.J. Rummel believes that the mass dyings associated with Great Leap Forward now constitute "democide" and revised his democide total for the People's Republic of China from 35 million to 77 million.[33]
One authoritative account of the famine, a 1,100-page study by Yang Jisheng, a long-time communist party member and a reporter for the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, puts the number of deaths from the Great Chinese Famine at 36 million. His book, entitled Tombstone (Mùbēi, 2008), challenges the official Communist Party line that the famine was largely a result of "Three Years of Natural Disasters" and he puts the blame squarely on Maoist policies, such as diverting agricultural workers to steel production instead of growing crops, and exporting grain at the same time.[34][35] During the course of his research, Yang uncovered that some 22 million tons of grain was held in public granaries at the height of the famine, reports of the starvation went up the bureaucracy only to be ignored by top officials, and the authorities ordered that statistics be destroyed in regions where population decline became evident.[36] Economist Steven Rosefielde argues that Yang's account "shows that Mao's slaughter was caused in considerable part by terror-starvation; that is, voluntary manslaughter (and perhaps murder) rather than innocuous famine."[37]
Another account by the aforementioned historian Frank Dikötter (Mao's Great Famine, 2010), which is based on recently accessible Chinese archival sources, places the death toll even higher, at 45 million minimum.[4] He claims that the census figures, which point to a death toll between 15 and 32 million, are largely inadequate, and that public security reports and secret reports collated by party committees towards the end of the Great Leap indicate the human cost was far greater.[4] He also notes that "Some historians speculate that the true figure stands as high as 50 to 60 million people."[4]
Yang notes that local party officials were indifferent to the large number of people dying around them, as their primary concern was the delivery of grain, which Mao wanted to use to pay back debts to the USSR totaling 1.973 billion yuan. In Xinyang, people died of starvation at the doors of grain warehouses.[38] Mao refused to open the state granaries as he dismissed reports of food shortages and accused the peasants of hiding grain.[39]
Mao and the Communist Party knew that some of their policies were contributing to the starvation.[40] Foreign minister Chen Yi said of some of the early human losses in November 1958[41]:

"Casualties have indeed appeared among workers, but it is not enough to stop us in our tracks. This is the price we have to pay, it's nothing to be afraid of. Who knows how many people have been sacrificed on the battlefields and in the prisons [for the revolutionary cause]? Now we have a few cases of illness and death: it's nothing!"

During a secret meeting in Shanghai in 1959, Mao demanded the state procurement of one-third of all grain to feed the cities and satisfy foreign clients, and noted that "If you don't go above a third, people won't rebel." He also stated at the same meeting[42]:

"When there is not enough to eat people starve to death. It is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can eat their fill."

Like in the USSR during the famine of 1932-33, peasants were confined to their starving villages by a system of household registration,[43] and the worst effects of the famine were directed against enemies of the regime.[44] Those labeled as "black elements" (religious leaders, rightists, rich peasants, etc.) in any previous campaign were given the lowest priority in the allocation of food, and therefore died in the greatest numbers.[44] According to genocide scholar Adam Jones, "no group suffered more than the Tibetans," with perhaps one in five dying from 1959 to 1962.[45]
Fuyang, a region with a population of 8 million in 1958, had a death rate that rivaled Democratic Kampuchea's Killing Fields.[46] More than 2.4 million people perished there over the next three years.[47]
However the experience across China was by no means uniform. Mobo Gao, Professor of Chinese Studies and director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Adelaide, lived through the Great Leap Forward and writes that in his home village in Jiangxi Province, there was a famine, but no one actually died of starvation. [48]
Deaths by violence
Not all deaths during the Great Leap were from starvation. Benjamin Valentino notes that "communist officials sometimes tortured and killed those accused of failing to meet their grain quota."[44] Frank Dikötter estimates that at least 2.5 million people were beaten or tortured to death and 1 to 3 million committed suicide.[49] He provides some illustrative examples. In Xinyang, where over a million died in 1960, 6-7 percent (around 67,000) of these were beaten to death by the militias. In Daoxian county, 10 per cent of those who died had been "buried alive, clubbed to death or otherwise killed by party members and their militia." In Shimen county, around 13,500 died in 1960, of these 12 per cent were "beaten or driven to their deaths."[50]
Beatings with sticks was the most common method used by local cadres (roughly half of all cadres regularly pummeled or caned people), but others devised harsher means to humiliate and torture those who failed to keep up. As mass starvation set in, ever greater violence had to be inflicted in order to coerce malnourished people to labor in the fields. Victims were buried alive, thrown bound into ponds, stripped naked and forced to labor in the middle of winter, doused in boiling water, forced to ingest excrement and urine, and subjected to mutilation (hair ripped out, noses and ears lopped off). In Guangdong, some cadres injected salt water into their victims with needles normally reserved for cattle.[51]
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